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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15351

-vsDAVID EDWARD ALBO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Unlawful Distribution
of a Controlled Substance for Value in violation of Utah
Code Ann.

§

58-37-8 (a)

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable James

s.

Sawaya, presiding.

On June 17, 1977,

appellant was found guilty of the offense charged and
sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State
Prison of zero to ten years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an aff irmance of the verdict
below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In

January, 1977, Detective Tom Carlson of

the Bountiful Police Department met Kayle Shaw, a former
drug user, who was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

Shaw informed Carlson that he wanted to be an

undercover narcotics agent (T.17,256).

After his release

from jail, Shaw had given the narcotics agents a list of
approximately fourteen names of persons he had bought drugs
from and whom he would help prosecute through controlled
narcotics purchases (T .128).

During the months of February,

March and April, Shaw, known undercover as Mike Days, made
controlled buys from nine different persons (T.261).
One such controlled buy was arranged on April 20, l~
when Shaw and co-defendant Gayle Boone agreed that Shaw would P~
the $1,000 price
(T.27,29)

quote~

by appellant for an ounce of THC

(THC is the street name for tetrahydrocanibol,

the active ingredient in marijuana).
On April 27, 1977, at about 5:00 p.m., Shaw called
Boone at The

Gym, 2827 South 3200 East, an exercise

-2-
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establishment frequented by Boone (T.346,350), and asked
if he had the THC (T.25).

Boone responded that ne

had it and told Shaw to come to The Gym to get it (T.25).
Shaw then telephoned Tom Carlson at the
office of the State Narcotics Law Enforcement Division at
the Utah State Fairgrounds and told him the delivery was
set (T.26).

On arrival at the Fairgrounds office, Shaw was

strip-searched, provided with $1,000 in bills which had been
xeroxed and whose numbers had been separately listed, wired
with a hidden, electronic transmitter and given a code
phrase to use to report that the buy had been made; all
standard procedures for undercover narcotics purchases (T.26,
173,175).

Detective Carlson also searched

found no narcotics secreted there (T.173).

~haw's

car and

At approximately

5:45 p.m. Shaw drove directly to The Gym, with six cars and
twelve agents following close behind (T.30,174).

On arrival

at The Gym, Boone told Shaw to take a break because "his
man" had not arrived yet (T.35).

Shaw drove to the 7-11 Store

at 3300 South 2300 East, followed by Agent Allred and Detective
Carlson (T.36,180).

Once again Shaw was patted down before

returning to the exercise club (T.26,180), where Boone
remarked that his delivery man would be driving a white
Continental.

A white Continental Mark IV arrived at 7:15;

Shaw went inside the building {T.47).

A few minutes later
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Ronne entered the cluh and qave Shaw a plastic baq
which contained a brown powder (proven to be PCP
[phencyclidine, an animal tranquilizer])

(T.308), after

Shaw had counted out and given appellant (identified by
Shaw atT.28) $1,000 (T.51).

Shaw transmitted the pre-

arranged signal to show that the buy had been made (T.52),
and Boone and Shaw left the building.

Boone got

into the passenger side of the white Continental driven
by a man identified by Agent Allred as appellant
David Albo (T.187).

Narcotics agents swarmed

over the scene, appellant and Boone were arrested, Agent
Fullmer recovered from appellant $980.00 of the Money supplied
to Shaw, and Shaw was placed under mock arrest (T.53,188,192,
288).

Agent Moore and Shaw initialed the baggie containing

the PCP, sealed it in a yellow packet, and Moore stored it in
the evidence locker until it was dispatched to Bruce Beck for
a toxicological analysis (T.296,300-301).
Appellant testified in his defense that Boone
called him that evening and told him that he could now pay
him money that Boone had borrowed from appellant in September,
1976 (T.407).

Appellant claimed he drove to The Gym and

Boone came to his car with a thousand dollars, saying that
his "man" had finally paid him (T.412).

As Boone began

counting out the money for appellant, the police officers
appeared, arrested the men, and seized the money which
appellant had placed in his pocket (T.413-414).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER RULE 6 3 ( 9) OF THE UTJl.H RULES OF EVIDENCE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY
OF KAYLE SHAW AND THE TAPE RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION
BETWEEN SHAW AND CO-DEFENDANT GAYLE BOONE.
During the trial, narcotics agent Kayle Shaw was
allowed to testify about a conversation he had with Gayle
Boone, in which Boone made a number of statements that incriminated appellant.
was also admitted.

A tape recording of that conversation

When appellant objected to admission of

the evidence against him, claiming it was barred as hearsay,
the court admonished the jury that at that time the evidence
was admissible only against co-defendant Boone (T.22).
Subsequently independent evidence was admitted
which established against Boone and appellant a prima facia
case of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.
That evidence consisted of the arrival of appellant at the
location of the drug sale (T.47), the approach of Boone,
empty-handed to appellant's car, the return to the gym of
Gayle Boone, clutching a plastic bag containing a brown substance, later proven to be PCP (T.308), and the subsequent
entry of Boone into appellant's car where police interrupted
him counting out several hundred dollars to appellant, who
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put the money in his pocket as police officers ordered him
from the vehicle (T.187,192).

This substantial amount of

independent evidence provided the basis for a finding by
the jury that beyond a reasonable doubt a conspiracy to distribute a controled substance existed between appellant and
Boone.

Once that conspiracy was established, the jury could

use under Rule 63(9) 1 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and current
case law (see ~) Boone's incriminating statements made
in furtherance of the conspiracy against appellant as evidence
to determine appellant's guilt

on the underlying substantive

charge of distribution of a controlled substance for value.
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941),
requires that a conspiracy be

proved by independent acts.

The statement of a person that he is the agent of another
will not suffice.

Respondent submits that in the instant ca~

these requirements were met and that the trial court properly
l RULE 63. HEARSAY EVIDENCE EXCLUDED--EXCEPTIONS
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and
inadmissible except:
(9) Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a
statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant
at the hearing if (a) the judge finds the declarant is unavailable as a witness and that the statement concerned a
matter within the scope of an agency or employment of the
declarant for the party and was made before the terminatior.
of such relationship, or (b) the party and the declarant
were participating in a plan to commit a crime or a civil
wrong and the statement was relevant to the plan or its
subject matter and was1 litlade while the plan was in existence
and before its complete execution or other termination, or
(c) one of the issues between the party and the proponent
of the evidence of the statement is a legal liability of
the declarant, and the statement tends to establish that
liability~
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submitted the evidence to the jury.

Appellant complains

that the trial court made no preliminary determination on
the admissibility of the co-conspirator's testimony, although
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
states, 314 F.2d 718
preliminarily decide

2

and Carbo v. United

(9th Cir. 1963) require that the court
if a prima facie case of conspiracy

has been made and submit

the evidence to the jury only after

so finding.
In the case at bar appellant never asked the court
3
Although the
for a specific finding on the conspiracy issue
2

3

RULE 8. PRELIMINARY INQUIRY BY JUDGE
When the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the
~dmissibil~ty of evidence, or the 7xistence of a privilege
is stated in these rules to be subJect to a condition, and
the fulfillment of the condition is in issue, the issue is
to be determined by the judge, and he shall indicate to the
parties which one has the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of proof on such issue as implied by the rule
under which the question arises. The judge may hear and
determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of
the jury, except that on the admissibility of a confession
the judge, if requested, shall hear and determine the question out of the presence and hearing of the jury. But this
rule shall not be construed to limit the right of a party
to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight
or credibility.
Respondent has observed that appellant filed no objection
to any jury instruction until after the jury had returned
its verdict and the day of sentencing had arrived (T.490,
5.2). Objections to jury instructions must be made before
the instructions are given to the jury. As this court said
in State v. Cowan 26 U.2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971):
"Rule 51 U.R.C.P. (applicable in criminal
proceedings unless otherwise provided) requires
that absent a contrary stipulation by the
parties, all instructions given a jury must be
in writing, and that objections to such written
instructions must be made before the instructions are given to the jury." (Emphasis added)
Although the trial court allowed appellant to timely make
his objections at sentencing (S.2), the record does not
indicate
the Lawstate
ever
stipulated
such
procedural
Sponsoredthat
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the Institute to
of Museum
and Library
Services
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-7-

trial court made no specific oral finding, an analysis of
the transcript shows conclusively that the court was mindful
of the requirements of law and of its duty to look for a
prima facie case of conspiracy before admitting the incriminating evidence.
The trial proceedings included the following
admonishment by the court after appellant had objected to
the hearsay:
"The record may show a continuing
objection of the defendant Alba through
Mr. Brown to the testimony of this witness relating a conversation had between
himself and the defendant Boone and I
would admonish the jury that that testimony at least at this time should not
be considered in your case or your
deliberations as against the defendant
Albo. " (T • 2 2) •
This cautionary instruction indicates that the coort
was alert to the requirements of Erwin, supra, and the giving
of Jury Instruction No. 16 4 demonstrated that by the close of
4 uuring the course of this trial the Court has received
testimony and evidence of conversations between- the defendant
Gayle Lee Boone and Kayle Shaw, Jr. , aka Mike Days with the
admonition from the Court that such testimony is not to be
considered as evidence against the co-defendant David Edward
Albo. Under the rules of evidence of the State of Utah, such
testimony and evidence is hearsay unless there has been
evidence presented which proves to your satisfaction, al":J
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the declarant, Gayle Lee ~oonei
and the co-defendant, David Edward Albo, were participating
in a plan to commit a crime and the statement was relevant
to the plan or its subject matter and was made while the plan
was in existence and before its complete execution or other
termination.
If you so find, you may consider any and all
statements made by the defendant Boone to Kayle Shaw aka .
Mike Days as substantive evidence against the defendant l-1""
(R. 8 5) •
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trial the court had been satisfied that if the state's
evidence were believed a prima facie case of conspiracy had
been established and that the jury would be entrusted with
the evidence to make their independent determination of
whether a conspiracy had been established beyond a reasonable
~,

based on evidence other than Kayle Shaw's testimony

and the tape recording.

Only if the jury so found could

statements made by co-defendant Boone to Shaw be considered
as substantive evidence against appellant.
Although the question of conditional admissibility
is for the trial judge to determine, there is no error in
conditionally admitting the statements before a prima facie
case was established by independent evidence if subsequently
such a case is proven, because the trial judge has wide discretion over the order of proof.

In South-East Coal Co. v,

Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767

(6th Cir. 1970), Con-

solidation objected to the admission of hearsay statements
until a prima facie conspiracy case had been proven.

The

Court of Appeals found that ?t the close of the plaintiff's
case there had been established by independent or disassociated
evidence a prirna facie case and that, therefore, the requirement for having conditionally admitted the statements was met.
Respondent submits that the trial court accurately
interpreted the requirements, Rule 63(9), of Erwin and Carbo,

-9-
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the latter also observing:
"It is well-established that the
declarations of one conspirator in
furtherance of the objects of the
conspiracy, made to a third party,
are admissible against his coconspirators." At 735)

Since the statements of co-defendant Boone concerning the
expected arrival of his drug delivery man were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy, the evidence was fully admissibl
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d
476 (1968), is relied upon by appellant to demonstrate that
the challenged evidence was improperly admitted.

Bruton

concerned a confession of co-defendant Evans to a postal
inspector, who testified that Evans admitted to him that he
and Bruton had committed armed postal robbery.

Evans did not

testify and his conviction was reversed on appeal because the
confession had been involuntary.

The United States Supreme

Court reversed Bruton' s conviction, holding that the introduc·:
tion of Evans' confession violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment
right of cross-examination, and that the limiting instruction
of the court cautioning the jury that the confession was
competent evidence only against Evans was insufficient to remo~
any prejudice to Bruton.
"A jury cannot 'segregate evidence
into intellectual boxes' . . . It cannot
determine that a confession is true insofar
as it admits that A has committed criminal
acts with B and at the same time effectively

-10-
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ignore the inevitable conclusion that B
has committed those same criminal acts
with A." 20 L.Ed.2d at 482, quoting
Justice Traynor in People v. Aranda, 63
Cal.2d 518, 528-529, 407 P.2d 265, 271272.

The case at bar does not concern a confession and
Bruton is, therefore, inapplicable.

However, the United States

Supreme Court did consider a matter similar to the present
case in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970),
where the trial court had admitted the testimony of a prosecution witness that an alleged accomplice of the defendant had
told the witness, who was a fellow prisoner, that if it had
not been for the defendant, "we wouldn't be in this now."
The alleged accomplice did not testify at trial.

The Court

reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which had found
Georgia's hearsay exception too broad and remanded the case
to the Circuit Court for consideration of other issues.

In

its plurality opinion, the Court listed several factors which
it had considered in finding that defendant Evans was not
denied his right of confrontation.
" . . . Third, the possibility that
Williams' statement was founded on
faulty recollection is remote in the
extreme. Fourth, the circumstances under
under which Williams made the statement
were such as to give reason to suppose
that Williams did not misrepresent Evans'
involvement in the crime. These reasons
go beyond a showing that Williams had no
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apparent reason to lie to Shaw.
His
statement was spontaneous, and it was
against his penal interest to make it.
These are indicia of realiability which
have been widely viewed as determinative
of whether a statement may be placed
before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant."
(Emphasis
added. ) 27 L.Ed.2d at 227
These observations are highly relevant in the
instant case where the tape recording of Boone's spontaneous
comments, made in anticipation of the drug transaction and
against Boone's penal interest, insure high reliability and
give additional support for Shaw's recollection of the conversation.

(The reliability is further enhanced by Boone's

ignorance of Shaw's status as undercover narcotics agent for
the probability is that had he known that Shaw was a
monitered agent, he would have made no statements which
incriminated either himself or appellant.)

Once the con-

spiracy was established, the jury was clearly entitled to
consider this relevant, reliable evidence.
Jackson v. Dunno, 37 U.S. 368, 12 L.Ed.2d 908
(1964), also relied upon by appellant, is inapplicable to
the case at bar.

Jackson concerns the prejudice which arises

when a jury determines both the voluntariness and the truthfulness of a defendant's confession.

This court is not faced

with a confession and the special procedural safeguards whi~
have attached to confessions have never been extended to the
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admissions of co-conspirators.

The constitutional protections

afforded a person who is beaten until he confesses to a
crime are significantly greater than those of a co-conspirator
who makes incriminating statements while pursing the criminal
objective of the conspiracy, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966),

Dutton v. Evans, supra, and California v. Gre·en,- infra.
In Point II of his brief, appellant attempts to

use Jackson, supra, and Bruton, supra, to support his claim
of denial of the right of confrontation.
neglected an important footnote in Bruton.

However, he has
Footnote 3 at

20 L.Ed. 481 states:
"There is not before us, therefore,
any recognized exception to the hearsay
rule insofar as petitioner is concerned
and we intimate no view whatever that
such exceptions necessarily raise
questions under the Confrontation Clause."
The focal point of the instant case is the validity of evidence
offered under the well-recognized hearsay exception of a coconspirator's admissions made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Respondent asserts that under current law no confrontation
problem arises.

Appellant correctly reports that the Con-

frontation Clause has been made obligatory on the states by
the Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment.
as the Court in Dutton, supra, added:
than the beginning of our inquiry."

But

" • • • that is no more
27 L.Ed.2d at 221.
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"It is not argued, nor could it
be that the constitutional right to
confrontation requires that no hearsay
evidence can ever be introduced.
In
the Pointer case itself, we referred
to the decisions of this Court that
have approved the admission of hearsay."
Id. at 222.
After remarking that such hearsay as

dy.u.J

-"P,..larations and

testimony of a deceased witness at a former trial are
admissible, the Court considered the Georgia statute at
issue.

Ga. Code Ann. § 38-306 (1954) provides:
"After the fact of conspiracy shall
be proved, the declarations by any one
of the conspirators during the pendancy
of the criminal project shall be admissible against all."

State courts had interpreted this statute to allow hearsay
testimony of statements made by the defendants during the
concealment phase of the conspiracy.
The Dutton court acknowledged that federal courts
have declined to extend the hearsay exception to include outof-court statements made during the concealment phase but
held the Georgia statute and interpretation constitutional
despite petitioner's claim of lack of confrontation.
"While it may readily be conceded
that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, it is quite a different
thing to suggest that the overlap is
complete and that the Confrontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification
of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
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common law. Our decisions have never
established such a congruence . • • " Id.
at 223.
In Dutton, petitioner Evans exercised his right
to confrontation on the factual question of whether Shaw
had actually heard Williams make the statement Shaw related;
and the court commented that the several indicia of reliability
made "the possibility that cross-examination of Williams
could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement,
though made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal."
Id. at 227.
Respondent submits that on this point Dutton is
analogous to the instant case because the corroborating tape
recording and independent verifying acts made i t wholly
unlikely that any cross-examination of Boone could have shown
that his own statements, though made to Shaw, were unreliable.
The court in Dutton ultimately declared that
"decisions of this court make it
clear that the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a
practical concern for the accuracy
of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials by assuring that
'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement.'
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
161,

26 L.Ed.2d t\89,

498

(1970) ."

27 L.Ed.2d at 227.
Respondent asserts that the admission of evidence

-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against appellant in this case accomplishes "the mission
of the Confrontation Clause."

The facts of the present case

distinguish it from Bruton, supra, and Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965),

1

I

(trial court allowed

testimony from a preliminary hearing witness though defendant\
was not then represented by counsel and had not cross-examinecl

I

the witness), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 13 L.Ed.ld
934 (1965),

(trial court permitted prosecution to read a

document purporting to be accomplice's confession after
accomplice had refused to testify in reliance upon his
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination) •

In con-

junction with the inherent reliability of the evidence,
appellant's inability to cross-examine co-defendant Boone,
who had exercised his right not to testify, posed no confrontation problem and under the rationale of Dutton v. Evans,
supra, and California v. Green, supra, the hearsay evidence
fairly admitted under the co-conspirator exception.
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POINT

II

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE HAVING BEEN
CLAIMED FOR VALID REASONS BY BRADLEY RICH, THE TRIAL
COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE THE
ATTORNEY TO TESTIFY.
For a period of two months in 1977, Bradley
Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association represented Kayle Shaw, who was facing three charges of
aggravated robbery (T.20,74).

With the jury absent,

counsel for co-defendant Boone called Mr. Rich to
testify and after several preliminary questions asked
the witness if he ever had occasion to discu7s Shaw's
work as an undercover agent for the State of Utah.
Bj~~ ~efused

Mr.

to answer the question on the ground that

a response would require him to divulge a confidence of a
client (T.357).

The attorney's refusal was in complete

accord with Rule 26(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
which provides:
"Subject to Rule 37 and except
as otherwise provided by paragraph 2
of this rule communications found by
the judge to have been between lawyer
and his client in the course of that
relationship and in professional
confidence, are privileged, and a
client has a privilege (a) if he is
the witness to refuse to disclose
any such communication, and (b) to
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prevent his lawyer from disclosing
it, and (c) to prevent any other
witness froM disclosing such
communication if it came to the
knowledge of such witness (i) in
the course of its transmittal
between the client and the lawyer,
or (ii) in a manner not reasonably
to be anticipated by the client,
or (iii) as a result of a breach
of the lawyer-client relationship.
The privilege may be claiMed by the
client in person or by his lawyer,
or if incompetent, by his guardian,
or if deceased by his personal
representative. The privilege
available to a corporation or
association terminates upon
dissolution."
The exceptions to this general rule are detailed
in 26 (2) and it is specifically upon 26 (2) ·ca) that appellant
bases his allegation that the privilege was improperly
claimed by Mr. Rich and sustained by the court.

Rule

26 ( :?) (a) states:

•

. "Such privileges shall not
extend (a) to a communication if the
judge finds that sufficient evidence,
aside from the communication, has been
introduced to warrant a finding that
the legal service was sought or obtained
in order to enable or aid the client to
commit or plan to commit a crime or
tort."
The record shows that Mr. Rich was hired .to represent Shaw on robbery charges and his January 10th appointment
occurred weeks before Shaw made overtures to Detective
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Carlson about the possibility of becoming an agent.

There

is no evidence to suggest that Shaw hired Mr. Rich to aid
him in the commission of a crime, and therefore no excepzion under 26(2) (a) exists, and the witness properly
invoked the attorney-client privilege on behalf of Kayle
Shaw.
Counsel urged the court to require Mr. Rich
to respond in camera, stating that the judge could then
determine for himself whether the communication was
privileged (T.360).

The court refused and deferred to

Mr. Rich's judgment and knowlege of the facts allowing
him to claim the privilege if he determined that answering
would violate a confidence (T.363).
No Utah case supports appellant's claim.

~

District Court of Second Judicial District, 550 P.2d 315
(Colo. 1976), is distingu_ishable.

It concerned the

work product exception in a grand jury proceeding.
People v. M~han, 1 Utah 205 (1875), is also inapplicable
as that defendant had consulted with the attorney for
the .§_Ole purpose of learning the legal effect of signing

another's name to a note.

Noteworthy here is the excerpt

cited by appellant, in which Lord Chief

Baron is quoted

as having said:
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"Where the original ground
of communication is malum in se
• • • this can never be included
within • • • professional
confidence." {Emphasis added.)
Once again ·the focus is on the motive for seeking legal
help, and Kayle Shaw's retention of counsel to represent
him in felony trials is a legitimate motive.
Finally, the Kansas case, State v. Henderson,
205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 {1970), is also distinguishable
as the defendant was the attorney's client, and the attorney
spoke up in an attempt to withdraw as counsel because his
client was uncooperative and insisted on giving perjured
testimony.

It must be noted, however, that the duty owed

to the court by a defendant's attorney is intrinsically
different from the duty owed by the former attorney of a
witness.

That the former may have a higher obligation to

keep perjured testimony from being given is no evidence
that the latter has the same responsibility.
Rule 26 allows an attorney to claim the privilege
on behalf of his client and makes no provision for a
setiarate determination by the court that the matter actually
is privileged.

The trial court,· therefore, properly allowed

Mr. Rich to claim the privilege and refused to testify
about confidences shared during his professional relationship with Kayle Shaw.
-20-
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POINT III
THE GRANTING OF A CONTINUANCE RESTS IN THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred
in not granting a continuance over a weekend so
that Carolyn Nichols, Kayle Shaw's former attorney,
could testify.

Appellant wanted to question Ms. Nichols

about Shaw's statement that she and Boone were
planning to have Shaw murdered.

After considerable

argument (T.400-404), the court made the following ruling
in denying appellant's request:
"THE COURT: I can't see that
that testimony or that evidence is
that damaging or prejudicial to the
defendant, frankly. We spent
considerable time on collateral
matters that didn't even bear on the
main issue of this trial and it seems
to me that that was one of them.
I
don't feel that the Jurors are going
to give any attention to that particular
part of the testimony. They will see if
[sic] for what it was and that was just
simply a conclusion or a statement of
the witness and I think he was more or
less pressured into saying something
on the stand and that just happened to
be it.
I don't feel that--if your
witness was available I would consent
to certainly let you reopen for the
purpose of putting her on the stand
and attempting to elicit her testimony
but I just feel in the interest of -in the interest of time and for an
orderly trial we should proceed until
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conclusion. I don't think we can
finish today.
In fact, we have
discussed it so long now that I
I would
am sure that we can't.
deny the motion to continue it
until Monday which is past the
weekend and we will proceed in the
morning."
(T.403-404).
State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 {Utah 1975),
announced the standard of review in determining if the
refusal to grant a continuance was prejudicial error:
"The granting of a continuance
of a case is a matter resting in the
sound discretion of the trial judge,
and that discretion will not be
interfered with on appeal except
where the court clearly abused its
discretion in the matter."
It is clear from the trial judge's statement that
he found that whole area of testimony for which the continuanc1
was sought to be collateral to the main issue, in no way
damaging or prejudicial to appellant, and time consuming
and inconvenient to the court.

These findings rebut

appellant's claim that the testimony would have been material,
likely to have affected the jury's verdict, and of little
inconvenience to the court, three factors which he cites
as necessary under a 1976 Alaska decision, Saluz;:n v. St:Jtc,)
P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976)..

In that case the appellant, convicted

of murder, was granted a new trial because the court found
that the expected testimony of an absent police officers
that he could see the victim's car from the road would be
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material to appellant's defense, where the state's theory
of the case was that the deceased's car could not be seen
from the road and appellant knew it was there only because
he had conunitted the killing.
The crucial nature of the denied testimony, so
clearly apparent in Salazar, is not present in the instant
case.

Here, the trial judge reasonably concluded that the

jurors would not take seriously Shaw's allegations of a
death plot.
The trial court made reasonable, proper findings
in his refusal to deny a weekend continuance pursuant to
his authority under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
which allows the exclusion of admissible evidence, and
therefore did not abuse his discretion.

Respondent urges

the court to reject appellant's claim.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED INTO EVIDEUCE
THE UNDERCOVER AGENT'S FULL VERSION OF THE EVENTS \'l!IICH
OCCURRED DURING THE PROTRACTED NARCOTICS TRANSACTION; SUSTAIN·
ING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS AND THE GIVING OF APPROPRIATE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CURED OTHER IMPERFECTIONS.

During the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, he
was questioned about the conversation that he had with Boone
while the two men awaited the delivery of the drugs.

Shaw

testified that Boone told him that "he still has an ounce
of An9el Dust down in his crib [apartment] . "

(T. 39)

Appellant

then moved for a mistrial and the trial court denied the
motion, stating that while it was a close question as to
whether this conversation was part of the

crime~

had not been prejudiced enough for a mistrial

appellant

(T.43-46).

Later Shaw made the statement that he doubted if he
would still be alive if
informo.nt.

Boone

had known that Shaw was an

An objection to the sta.te1:ient '.:as fT:a.de .:Ji1d sustJ:: 1

the remark stricken, and the jury admonished to disregard the
answer of the witness

(T.140).

-24Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The final complaint concerning Kayle Shaw's testimony is that he said that he had fired his attorney because
he believed that she was conspiring with
him up [for assassina~ion) ."

(T.142).

Boone

'to "set

Appellant's motion

for a mistrial was denied and the trial judge said that he
didn't think the appellant had been prejudiced and that it was
highly unlikely that the jury's verdict would be based on
this one statei:ient (T.146).

Shaw admitted on csross-examination

that co-defendant Boone had never threatened him (T.153).
Utah case law provides the proper standard for
determining when a motion for-a mistrial should be granted.
The standard is established in several recent cases, among
them State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P. 2d 1323 (1974), and
State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972).

In each

case unanimous courts affirmed the decisions of the lower courts
to deny motions for mistrial.

This Court noted that a mistrial

should be granted if the trial judge believes that an error has
been made and that "in light of the total proceeding there has
been such prejudice that the defendant cannot have a fair and
impartial determination of his guilt or innocence." 517 P.2d
at 1324.
On review this Court considers these two propositions
and should reverse only if it appears that(!) error did occur

-25-
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and(2) substantial prejudice resulted to the extent that
there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error,
there would have been a different result. 502 P.2d

at 114.

In reviewing the facts this Court acknowledges the

authori~

and advantaged position of the trial judge and will not upset
his ruling. unless it clearly appears that he had abused his
discretion. 517 P.2d

at 1324 and 502 P.2d

at 114.

Respondent submits that on review of the record
and in light of analysis below, this court will find that the
trial court carefully and thoughtfully made his rulings and
he did not abuse his discretion.
The trial court did not actually determine if the
first alleged error was in fact error, rather calling it a
close question, and finding that even if it were error, theu
had not been enough prejudice to warrant a mistrial.

Impliill

in this finding is the determination that the verdict of the
jury does not hinge on Shaw's reference to Boone's possession
of Angel Dust.

Respondent further submits that under Rule 550

the Utah Rules of Evidence, the inclusion within Shaw's tesfr
mony of appellant's statement that he was in possession of
Angle Dust was proper.

Hhile not admissible as proof of guilt

of the crime charged, it is admissible as tendiny to showin:,n
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n

.

plan and lack o f mistake.

5

Additional support for admission of the statement
comes from State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977).

In

reversing a lower court conviction on other grounds, the
majority rebuffed appellant's claim that testimony was admitted
in violation of Rule 55:
"The testimony concerning the other
allegedly criminal acts [the robbery of
other persons) committed by the defendant
during the course of the commission of
the crime with which he was charged,
were, in fact, eyewitness descriptions
of the events that occurred." 571 P.2d
at 1353.
On this basis a narration of the conversation between Boone
and Shaw as they awaited delivery of the PCP was proper, even
if it included a minor reference to other drugs to. be sold,
such a reference not being sufficiently prejudicial to require
exclusion from Shaw's chronological account of the events at
the meeting.
Regarding the second incident, the sustaining of the
objection to the improper response and the cautionary admonition to the jury cured any potential prejudice:

As the Hodges

5
RULE 55, OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL WRONGS.
Subject to Rule 47
evidence that a person committed a crime or civil ~rong on a
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence
is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact
inclmling absence of mistake or· accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.
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court remarked:
"In the absence of something
persuasive to the contrary, we assume
that the jurors were conscientious in
performing to
[sic] their duty, and
that they followed the instructions
of the court." 517 P.2d at 1324.
Respondent submits that because no evidence was offered to
support the claim of prejudice and in deference to the trial
court's authority, this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling.
In reference to the third allegation, that a mistriil
should have been declared after Shaw's remark about his previou
attorney, respondent urges the Court to sustain the action of
the trial court in denying the motion.

Having found no

prejudice, the trial judge could not grant a mistrial.

The

credibility of a witness is for the jury to determine, and it
is unlikely that jurors would have seriously considered Shaw's
claim that his former attorney, a member in good standing of
the Utah Bar, had been involved in an assassination plot.
The trial judge stated that he did not believe that the
testimony was damaging or prejudicial to appellant, the issue
was a collateral one with no bearing on the main issue of
appellant's guilt in distributing a controlled subsLance

fo~

value, and he did not believe the jurors would give it anothe:
thought (T.403-404).

Given this inherent incredibility of
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the testimony, there was little likelihood that Shaw's remark
would have substantial impact on the jury, as to alter the
verdict, and the motion for mistrial was properly denied.
POINT V
THE ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT WAS ACTUALLY PROPER REBUTTAL IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE
TOTAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
Appellant made no objections to statements in the
prosecutor's closing argument, and the general rule is that
a failure to raise objections at trial precludes the consideration of those issues on appeal unless such exceptional circumstances exist that a miscarriage of justice would result if
the matter were not considered.
118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971).

State v. Winger, 26 Utah 2d

Appellant cites a California case,

People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 324 P.2d 556 (1958), as providing the exceptions relied upon.
about

~efendant's

Namely, (1) grave doubts

guilt and(2) the inability to obviate or

cure the alleged error.

Respondent contends that evidence

in the instant case was not evenly divided, so as to make
the issue of appellant's guilt a close question.

Appellant's

only evidence was his own testimony that Boone was simply
repaying an old debt although the state had earlier produced
overwhelming evidence of guilt.

Respondent also submits that

even if error occurred during the argument stage, it was minor,
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and the trial judge was fully equipped to obviate any potent[,)
prejudice with appropriate admonishments and further cautionary
instructions.
Counsel for co-defendant Boone included in his closin
argument a statement (partially Jury Instruction No. 10)

wh~

informed the jury of Boone's constitutional right not
to testify and that no presumption of guilt should arise fioo
the exercise of that privilege.

He noted that a defendantrnij

have several reasons for not testifying - among them his
satisfaction with the evidence presented or his reluctance
to be cross-examined (T.458).
During his argument the prosecutor alluded to
defense counsel's comments:
"He read the instruction about the
defendant not testifying and not creating a presumption against him and he
said the reason why the defendant did
not testify--he said I am a skilled
prosecutor and I would have had a
chance to cross~examine him.
No question
about that.
I would suggest that maybe
that is the reason." (T. 4 83)
Mr. Yocum then observed that Kayle Shaw was crossexamined for two and one-half hours by two very skilled
attorneys, yet cane through i t very successfully, while
edging that Shaw had admitted possessing LSD on occasion.
Respondent contends that the prosecutor's remarks
were wholly proper.

They were in harmony v1i th the argument
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guidelines of State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975),and
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977),and State v. White,
(Utah Case No. 15210, filed 3/13/78),and in accord with the
constitutional mandate that the prosecution must not comment
on the failure of the defendant to testify.

See Griffin v.

California, 380 U.S. 609,14 L.Ed 2d 106 (1965).
In State v. Kazda, supra, the prosecutor had stated
during closing argument, "The defense· has presented no evidence
as to why the defendant was out there.
there?"

What was he doing out

As in the instant case, Kazda neither testified nor

called witnesses.

After noting that trial counsel have both

a right and a duty to analyze all aspects of the evidence,
including what it is or isn't and what it shows and doesn't
show, the court found the prosecutor's comment to be proper.
In State v. Eaton, supra, we find an overzealous
prosecutor who crossed the line between commenting on the total
evidence and commenting specifically on the defendant's failure
to testify.

That case also involved a controlled drug buy and

during closing argument the prosecutor stressed the fact that
only the state's chief witness and the defendant "really knows
[sic] •.-1hat took place in that house" and then asked "What does
the defendant tell us?"

Later he referred again t_o the defen-

dant's failure to testify and explain.

The defendant in
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~aton

received a new trial.
The facts of Eaton are not similar to the instant
case.

Here the prosecutor• s emphasis was not on Boone's

failure to testify, where he merely supported defense
counsel's comments, rather it was on the thoroughness and
consistency of Kayle Shaw's testimony.
The most recent Utah case on this issue, State v.
White, supra, makes clear that in appropriate circumstances
the prosecutor may make an observation on a defendant's
silence, as long as the purpose is not to encourage the
jury to draw inferences of guilt from what was not said,
but to see the total picture of the evidence.

In White, also

a drug case, the defendant was asked on direct examination
only his name, address, and occupation.

During closing

argument the prosecutor said that because the scope of crossexamination is limited by the direct examination, he could
not ask the defendant about how he came to be in possession
of heroin and cocaine' how much he was being paid for it, etc.
In affirming the conviction, the Court found the remarks
a proper part of the prosecutor's analysis of the evidence
and that the prosecutor merely pointed out what the jury
already knew--that the defendant hqd purposely limited his
testimony to avoid saying anything about his involvement
or non-involvement.

-32-
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When compared with these three fact patterns,
it is abundantly clear that the prosecutor's remarks
in this case were proper and completely within the
guidelines of constitutionally permissible evidence
analysis.

Even if this Court finds them to be error,

they would be harmless under Hodges, supra, and Mitchell,
supra, especially as the comments applied only to Boone,
appellant having testified in his own behalf.
Appellant also alleges that the trial court
committed further error by allowing Mr. Yocum to read
from a transcript of the tape recording when the transcript
had earlier been refused admission into evidence.

However,

the prosecutor had personally listened to the tape, which
had been admitted into evidence, and in refreshing his
memory of what was on the tape, he is allowed to use any
writing to jog his memory.

McCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed.,

1973, Chap. 1,

The transcript accurately

§

9, p. 15.

represented what he heard and he was therefore properly
using the transcript for memory refreshing only and so stated
at T. 487.

The judge's actual ruling is unclear; he initially

found Mr. Yocum's use of the transcript objectionable, but
after the prosecutor argued present recollection refreshed,
the judge agreed that Mr. Yocum could refer to what was
on the tape· (T.487).

Moreover, a prosecutor's closing
-33-
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argument is not evidence and the jury in this case was so
advised (T.434).
Respondent rejects appellant's contention that
the jurors probably drew the inference that the transcript
of the tape which was available, probative evidence, had
been kept from them by the court.

The jury heard the

tape during their deliberations and decided for themselves
what the voices were saying, cognizant that Agent Allred
had also listened to it and typed a transcription (T.191).
Jury Instruction No. 6 clearly charged the jury to consider
only the evidence, both offered and admitted, and the
presumption is that the jury did its duty and followed
its instructions.
Nevertheless, cases cited by appellant do not
support his clairn.

In People v. Gilmer, 110 Ill.App.2d 73,

249 N.E.2d 129, 133 (1969), the court found the "determining
factor was whether there was a reasonable possibility that
improperly introduced evidence might have contributed to
the conviction."

Respondent contends that it is substantially

unlikely that the refusal of the court to allO'.•l the jury to
see a transcript that

on~

narcotics officer had made of a
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tape which the jurors would themselves listen to, combined
with an earlier remark about the prosecutor's cross- ·
examination skills, affected the jury's verdict.

Unless

appellant can show that but for these occurrences, if
deemed error, the jury would likely have returned a not
guilty verdict, the conviction must stand.

Since

appellant has not met the burden of State v. Eaton,
supra, respondent urges the Court to reject appellant's
arguments, no substantial evidence having been
offered to support an acquittal.
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POINT VI
AS NO SIGNIFICANT ERRORS OCCURRED IN THE CONDUCT
OF THE TRIAL, THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL, CUMULATIVE EFFECT,
Respondent submits that the trial court conducted
a fair trial for appellant and has offered evidence and case
law in previous sections which demonstrate

that neither

the prosecutor nor the court committed prejud.icial error.
State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P. 2d 323

Oij
I

cited as support by appellant is not analogous to the instant
case.

Paul St. Clair had been convicted of murder and sen-

tenced to death, and the court then, as now, scrupulously
searched the record in death-penalty cases for significant
error, whether raised on appeal or not.

The errors complaineo

of in that case were individually significant, though not
prejudicial, and the court decided that significant errors
can have a cumulative prejudicial effect.

In the instant

case there were no significant errors.
Appellant has not shown that the outcome would
have been different even if claimed errors had not occurred
and his conviction should therefore be affirmed.

POINT VII
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-9-401,

402 (SUPP. 1977), ALLOW WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC

EAVESDROPPING WHERE THE TRANSMITTER IS ATTACHED TO A WILLING
INFORMANT-PARTICIPANT.
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Appellant argues that the plurality opinion of
Justice White in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 28
L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), is a misstatement and misanalysis of
the law concerning privacy and electronic eavesdropping.
He urges this Court to reject this Supreme Court interpretation of case law and constitutional standards and asks
this Court to hold that warrantless electronic monitoring
of a volunteer participant in a controlled drug purchase
violates the constitutional right of privacy and is
unreasonable search and seizure of the conversation.
Respondent submits that the White decision is correct and
logical and represents the current law in the area of
privacy and warrantless electronic searches.
In White, a case very similar to the instant
case, the trial court overruled appellant's objections to
testimony by government agents regarding conversations
between the accused and an informant which the agents
overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter concealed on the informant.

The prosecution was

unable to locate and produce the informant at trial.
Relying on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

l~

L.Ed.2d

576 (1967), which held inadmissible recordings of
conversations made by government agents by means of a
listening device attached to the outside of a public
-37-
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telephone booth, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed White's conviction.

On certiorari, the United

States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit decision.
In an opinion joined by Burger.,Chief Justice,
Stewart, Justice, and Blackmun, Justice, Mr. Justice
Whiteconfronted the issue of:
"
• whether the Fourth
Amendment bars from evidence the
testimony of governmental agents
who related certain conversations
which had occurred between defendant
White and a government informant,
Harvey Jackson, and which the agents
overheard by monitoring the frequency
of a radio transmitter and concealed
on his person." 28 L.Ed.2d at 456.
(Mr. Justice Black concurred and quickly disposed of the
Fourth Amendment claim, citing his dissent in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. at 591, wherein he stated that the framers
of the Constitution had not intended to r.estrict or outlaw th:
use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, with wiretapping
merely a sophisticated form of eavesdropping.)
The Court acknowledged that Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), overruled Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944

(1928), and

Gold;n0n,

-1

v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), which
held that an actual physical trespass or invasion was required
before the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable

-38-
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searches and seizures arose, therefore exempting wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping which originated beyond the
curtilage

of a home.

Katz, supra, held inadmissible

recordings obtained from a listening device placed on the
outside of a phone booth without defendant Katz's knowledge
or consent, where the government agents had not obtained
a search warrant, thereby violating the privacy on which
Katz had justifiably relied.
The White Court distinguished and limited Katz,
noting that Katz did not involve the use of a government
informant who reported the conversation content to the
government.

Nor did the Katz Court:
"
• indicate in any way that
a defendant has a justifiable and
constitutionally protected expectation
that a person with whom he is conversing
will not then or later reveal the conversation to police." 28 L.Ed.2d 457.

Therefore, Katz with its warrant requirement is limited to
those circumstances not involving a participating informant.
Katz only applies to occasions in which the government seeks
to surreptitiously monitor phone calls and/or conversations
in private places.

Consequently, Katz is inapplicable to the

case at bar, for here the state's chief witness, who agreed
to wear a concealed transmitter, was a volunteer undercover
agent participating in the controlled drug buy with Boone.
-39-
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Unlike Katz, in which the recordings were made for the
purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal activity, the
instant case included the use of a transmitter primarily
to provide protection for Kayle Shaw, the undercover
agent (T.171).

Should a narcotics dealer learn that the

intended purchaser is actually a narcotics agent, the
agent's life is placed in serious immediate jeopardy; a
transmitter allows supporting police officers to

~ove

in

quickly if the transmission reveals that the undercover
agent is in trouble.
Appellant alleges that Justice White misconstrued
earlier cases on the informant eavesdropping or electronic
monitoring topic,particularly Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 17 L.E.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); and Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963).

Although these pre-

Katz opinions arose in the trespass analysis era of the
United States Supreme Court, United States v. White, supra,
found all three cases to be unaffected by Katz.

The Court

in Hoffa, supra, announced in clear language that the Fourth
Amendment offers no protection to a defendant who relies
upon a colleague's trust, only to learn that the "trusted
colleague" is a government agent who reports regularly to

-40Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the authorities.
"Neither this Court nor anv
member of it has ever expressed-the
view that the Fourth Amendment
protects a wrongdoer's misplaced
belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it." 17 L.Ed.2d at
382.
Since no electronic monitoring occurred in Hoffa, the only
question presented to the Hoffa court which has relevance
to this case was the admissibility of the informant's
testimony.

Any attempt to determine from the opinion how

the Court would have treated the admissibility of testimony
of an electronically eavesdropping government agent if such a
person had existed is unproductive speculation.
Lewis v. United States, supra, concerned the admissibility of narcotics purchased from the defendant at his
home by an undercover federal narcotics agent.

Appellant

alleged that the deception violated his Fourth Amendment
rights but the Court rejected the claim, stating:
"Were we to hold the deceptions
of the agent in this case constitutionally prohibited, we would come
near to a rule that the use of
undercover agents in any manner is
virtually unconstitutional per se.
Such a rule would, for example,
severely hamper the government in
ferreting out those organized
crininal activities that are
characterized by covert dealings
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with victims who either cannot or
do not protest. A prime example is
provided by the narcotics traffic."
17 L.Ed.2d at 316.
While neither Hoffa nor Lewis involved electronic
eavesdropping, they do support the general propositions
that (1) the enforcement of narcotics laws requires stealth,
covert operations, and the participation and cooperation of
informants or undercover agents and (2) Fourth Amendment
protections do not extend to defendants who knowingly violate
the criminal laws and who seek acquittal solely because they
shared incriminating information and/or engaged in criminal
activity

with a per son who was a covert government agent who

subsequently testified against them.
The third case cited by White in supporting its
holding and more nearly on point to the instant case and
to the White facts is Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
10 L.Ed.2d 462

(1963).

In Lopez, the appellant was convicted

of attempting to bribe an Internal Revenue Service agent,

a~

the offer of the bribe had been secretly recorded by the
agent during a meeting at Lopez's office.

Appellant claimed

that the recording should not have been admitted into
evidence, but the Court rebuffed his challenge, observing
that the recording device had not been planted during a
trespass but had been carried in and out by an agent who
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was there with petitioner's assent, and that the device
neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself.

The

Court then focused on appellant's real complaint:
"Stripped to its essentials,
petitioner's argument amounts to
saying that he has a constitutional
right to rely on possible flaws in
the agent's memory, or to challenge
the agent's credibility witho~t
being beset by corrohorating
evidence that is not susceptible
of impeachment. For no other
argument can justify excluding an
accurate version of a conversation
that the agent could testify to
from memory.
We think the risk that
petitioner took in offering a bribe
to Davis fairly included the risk that
the offer would be accurately reproduced
in court, whether by faultless memory
or mechanical recording."
10 L.Ed.2d
at 471.
In allowing evidence of the recorded conversation
the Court in Lopez reasoned that if the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do
not violate a defendant's constitutionally justifiable
privacy expectations:
"
• • neither does a simultaneous
recording of the same conversations made
by th~ agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom
the defendant is talking and whose
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily
risks."
28 L.E.2d at 458.
Given the antecedent case law analyzed in White, the
plurality opinion harmonized the surviving cases in the
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eavesdropping area and arrived at several reasonable
conclusions, which while aiding law enforcement safeguard
constitutional rights of citizens.

These conclusions are:

(1) as the law does not protect a wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is a police agent, neither should it protect
him when the same agent records or transmits the
conversation, which is later offered into evidence;

(2)

having resolved any doubts about an accomplice being an
informant, a wrongdoer is unlikely to distinguish between
probable informers on one hand and probable informers
with transmitters on the other to the extent requiring
discrete constitutional recognition of those differences;
(3) the courts should be wary of erecting constitutional
barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also
accurate and reliable, recognizing that a defendant who

~s

no right to exclude an agent's testimony ought not be alloweo
to exclude a more accurate version of the events;

(4) it

would be untenable to find that while the undercover agent
without a warrant has acted "reasonably," once he straps oo
a transmitter his "reasonable" activities are sucldenly
transformed into an "unreasonable" investigation in violrt~'
of Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Respondent asserts that in the instant case a
reasonable, legal investigation and arrest occurred.
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Although Kayle Shaw was wired with a transmitter for his own
protection, it was reasonable, proper and in accord with
applicable law to admit the tape recording and allow the
jurors to hear the best evidence of what actually transpired
in The Gym.
This position is fully supported by Utah law.

The

privacy section of Utah Code Ann. S 76-9-401 (Supp. 1977),
provides the following definition:
" ( 2)
'Eavesdropping' means to
overhear, record, amplify, or transmit
any part of a wire or oral communication
of others without the consent of at
least one party thereto by means_ of
any electronic, mechanical, or other
device."
(Emphasis added.)
This provision certainly provides for and protects the use
of wired, undercover operatives, and as Kayle Shaw had
consented to the attachment of the transmitter to his
person, no violation of Section 76-9-402 occurred.
Finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-1 (1953),
as amended, it is doubtful if a search warrant could have
been issued.

Warrants are limited to the seizure of personal

property and considerable imagination and judicial creativity
would have to be employed to equate the sound vibrations of
a person's voice with personal property.
As noted by appellant, Michigan is a state which
has decided that a search warrant is requireq in these
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circumstances.

See People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227

N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 878, 46 L.Ed.2d 111.
However, the Michigan search warrant statute, Mich.
Compiled Laws 780.652, is unlike the Utah statute in that
it authorizes the seizure of personal property and "other
thing[s)."

Perhaps because sound waves can be categorized

as "other thing[s]" they are therefore seizable, but no
such exception is codified in Utah.

While acknowledging

that this court has the power to provide an individual with
greater protection under the state constitution than he
enjoys under the federal constitution, respondent urges this
Court not to adopt the minority Michigan view.

Instead,

this Court should uphold the admissibility of the tapes.
Such a decision would acknowledge both the genuine

indiv~u~

protections of the Fourth Amendrnent and societal protections
against

abandoning the Fourth Amendment to lawbreakers who

use it primarily to shield themselves from criminal culpability.

In United States v. White, the Court weighed and

balanced the needs of effective law enforcement against the
right of a:-i i:-idividual to be
and seizures.

frc~e

from unreasonable searches

Respondent believes that the White analysis is

correct and appellant's conviction should therefore be
affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument and current case
law, respondent urges this court to enter an order affirming the verdict and judgment of the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSON
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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